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Football Clubs and Financial Crimes in Greece 
Introduction  
As the more popular sport in the world, football is a huge industry that is 
growing globally. According to Deloitte (2014), it is estimated that the turnover of the 
Big Five football leagues1 only will exceed €11.5 billion in the 2014-2015 period. In 
addition to offering a legally neutral setting for schmoozing with respectable and risk-
taking elites, the huge turnover in the football industry makes it extremely attractive 
to illicit entrepreneurs, and to corruption, tax evasion, and gaming malpractices 
which threaten the actual and perceived integrity of the sport (see, for example, the 
bribery allegations against football’s governing body, FIFA; Moore and Scannell, 
2015). These practices and activities are very often associated with sinister, criminal 
‘organisations’ that are external to the world and industry of football, and supposedly 
‘invade’ it in order to exploit it as much as possible. In media coverage, academic, 
and other literature, football match-fixing is often associated with hierarchical 
‘organised criminal organisations’ with an international reach. For example, Ralf 
Mutschke, FIFA’s head of security, suggests that “organised crime recently switched 
from drug trafficking to match-fixing” and that “the business of match manipulation [is] 
irresistibly attractive to international organised crime” (Mutschke, 2013: ix-x). 
Moreover, references to ‘mafias’ infesting the world of football and using it as 
a moneymaking and money laundering platform are commonplace (see Feltes, 2013; 
UNODC, 2013). As reported by Boniface et al. (2012: 26 cited by Di Ronco and 
Lavorgna, 2014), generally speaking, ‘organised crime’ seems to favour the most 
popular sports, which make it possible “to carry out underground criminal activities 
back-to-back with a positive public image, that of a sport with millions of supporters” 
(the so-called “image-laundering”). UK soccer clubs such as Glasgow Rangers, 
Leeds United and Portsmouth have been embroiled in takeover and financial 
scandals involving domestic and foreign owners charged with serious offences, and 
there are heated issues about the role and denotation of ‘fit and proper’ director 
requirements.  
The aim of the current article is to provide an account of the financial crimes 
that are committed within football clubs in Greece. Among other, this article responds 
in a more structured manner to the lack of empirical studies on the issue 
internationally (with the exception of ‘match-fixing’ in some contexts), and to 
Haberfeld and Sheehan’s (2013) ‘hope’ that new initiatives for the study of 
manifestations of sport-related crime issues in general are developed. Although this 
is a case study from Greece, it constitutes a potential template for research on an 
international level. By using the case of football and football clubs in Greece, what 
we try to do in this article is to add to understandings of the complexity of the broader 
motivational context of financial crime (see, for example, the works on fraud by Levi, 
                                            
1 English Premier League, Spanish La Liga, Italian Serie A, German Bundesliga and French Ligue 1 
2008a; 2008b; see also Levi, 1999; Hollow, 2014), the information available about 
which (as well as the information on the impact or the actual threat financial crimes 
pose) is often “just a marketing hype” (Levi, 2011; see also Levi and Burrows, 2008). 
In the following sections we will present: (a) the methods and data used for the study; 
(b) the different manifestations or a typology of financial crimes committed within 
football clubs; and (c) a discussion of our findings by locating them within the 
contemporary football-related and non-football-related socio-economic situation in 
Greece and beyond. 
Data and Methods  
The primary source of information for this article is ethnographic research that 
one of the authors of this article conducted while being employed on a full-time basis 
in two football clubs in Greece. One of the clubs is one of the major and most 
popular clubs in country, and part of the Super League (first division), whereas the 
other is a historic club in the second division (also known as ‘Football League’ in 
Greece). The ethnographic work offered the researcher the opportunity to study 
individuals who seldom offer themselves for examination, and a unique opportunity 
for exploration. This part of the research required immersion in the field for a 
significant amount of time (from August 2008 to February 2011 and from April 2011 
to April 2013), and participation in activities that were not related to the collection of 
data per se (Hobbs and Antonopoulos, 2014). Within the context of the ethnographic 
research, additional information on the issues at stake was obtained through 
interviews with informed actors from the realm of Greek football (e.g. individuals 
working within football clubs in the Greek Super League and Football League).  
Secondly, with regards to match-fixing in particular, we used the telephone 
conversations that were available as the result of wiretapping by the National 
Intelligence Agency (Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion - EYP) in relation to the latest 
football match-fixing scandal (2011)2. These wiretapped conversations were able to 
offer abundant information about the broad range of actors and groups involved, and 
identify patterns of social organisation across a number of cases many of which were 
related to one another.  
Finally, we collected, examined and analysed the published media sources 
which allowed us to obtain information not only on the process behind financial 
crimes within football clubs, but also on the key actors involved. Articles from five 
newspapers were selected, namely Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini, Ta Nea, To Proto 
Thema and To Vima from April 2010 to February 2015. The newspapers mentioned 
above were chosen for the particular research because they are non-sport3 and non-
tabloid newspapers that are circulated throughout the whole country. It was decided 
that non-sport and non-tabloid newspapers would be used only as there is a greater 
possibility for more informed accounts to be found in this type of newspapers.  
                                            
2 Hereafter, referred to as EYP (2011) 
3 Most sports newspapers are tied to the major football clubs and tend not to have an objective stance. 
As with any study, the current study presents some limitations, which should 
be acknowledged at this stage. The first one has to do with the ethnographic part of 
the study. There can be no guarantee that the information given is a wholly neutral 
representation of the activities and links between actors, though the researcher 
attempted to make them as close to that as possible; one needs to remember that 
accounts offered in an ethnographic study are consciously or unconsciously 
interpreted by the researcher. Moreover, the data are limited to what the participants 
have provided and what has the researcher observed, and they cannot be 
generalised to the whole football scene. In relation to the interviews with the 
informed actors there are issues of generalizability, and one can never be absolutely 
certain about validity, although ‘crosschecking’ and ‘member checking’ significantly 
contributed towards eliminating untruthful accounts. In addition, there is also the 
issue of representativeness of the sample. In many instances researchers used a 
method of snowballing sampling to identify participants, thus limiting the sample to 
the researcher’s own personal network and, as a consequence, the scope of the 
findings (see Levi, 2015). 
The second set of limitations is related to the wiretapped conversations by the 
Greek National Intelligence Agency. These are the result of law enforcement activity, 
which in turn is affected by resource restrictions, the competency of agents, 
organizational priorities, and wider political priorities (see Kinzig 2004). As with any 
product of the state derived from largely unaccountable agencies, wiretapped 
conversations need to be carefully handled and the extent to which their revelations 
apply beyond the clubs affected remain uncertain.  
The final set of limitations is related to media sources. Not only do they most 
often refer to those cases which the authorities came across, thus not reporting 
‘successful’ schemes, but they also tend to present the issues relating to the actors 
or the activity/market itself in a sensational and morally charged manner. What else 
could one expect? Nevertheless, we think that the methodological triangulation 
throughout the study – involving both official and ‘unofficial’ sources - has created a 
net that has captured the most important aspects of the topic under investigation and 
we believe and claim that there is a high degree of validity in the findings.  
Financial (and finance-related) crimes committed within football clubs  
Ticket tricks  
Match-day tickets are one of the main sources of income for football clubs, especially 
in divisions where TV rights and sponsorship agreements are not very lucrative (see 
Triandafyllou, 2012). As an income source, ticket sales of each club are taxed. This 
taxation process and calculation, however, bears some rather unique characteristics, 
which will be further analysed in this section. In football, and due to the rather 
complex taxation system, match-day tickets are not limited to the categories 
available on the stands around a football ground. On the contrary, an additional 
category of tickets, that most people do not have access to, is also issued: season 
tickets (Kathimerini, 2012).  
Both match-day and season tickets are issued approximately ten days before 
each match. Their overall number is decided on a calculation of the number of 
people expected to attend the match for match-day tickets, and on the number of 
people who bought season cards for the latter (season tickets). Overall, they 
represent the maximum capacity of spectators each match can have, a number that 
is then announced to and signed off firstly by the governing body of the league and 
then by both the local police and the tax service.  
The process through which these tickets are sold and how this sale is then 
reported is rather peculiar in Greek football. As far as the match tickets are 
concerned, the majority of the sales takes place a few hours before the match and 
consists of a transaction of money for a paper ticket, which will be then checked 
while entering the stadium by both the security staff and the league’s ‘official 
auditors’. The season tickets, however, are hardly ever exchanged as such. The 
common practice within the football industry is for the senior employees of the ticket 
office to arrange with both the security guards and the ‘official auditors’ to let the 
season card holders enter the stadium, while keeping an account of their overall 
number (see Kathimerini, 2012). After the match is over, the ‘auditors’ would then 
inform the ticketing employees of the total number of season card holders who 
entered the stadium and the corresponding tickets would be destroyed, as if they 
were given to each season card holder individually. The overall number of both 
match day and season tickets would be then used to calculate the income generated 
by ticket sales, on which the team will be taxed. 
What is described above is the ideal situation of this agreement between the 
employees and the auditors. However, common practices in Greek football tend to 
follow a different path (see Eleftherotypia, 2014). Ticketing employees are often 
awarded the role of the ‘negotiator’ in this agreement, in order to convince the 
auditors to write down a number of season card holders who entered the stadium 
that is smaller than the actual number. This negotiation is ‘expected’ by the auditors 
who often take pride in being ‘understanding’ towards the club, especially when the 
overall attendance at a match is not high. The number agreed, which is substantially 
lower than the actual one, is then written on the official documentation of the match, 
which is signed by the auditor and communicated to the tax service, the local police 
and the governing body of the league, as well as the accounting department of the 
club which will then calculate tax liability. In one of the many occasions that one of us 
was present, as auditors claimed: “we understand the situation of the club, it’s 
difficult to get people in, we know, but don’t worry, I’m understanding... we had 210 
(season card holders) in, how about we say 180?”  
There have been occasions when the club could not issue an adequate 
number of match tickets, due to miscalculations on behalf of the club, or due to other 
financial problems within the club (lack of tax certificate – discussed below). In these 
occasions, the negotiation becomes more complex. The league’s auditors are 
notified of the situation and a different approach in terms of transactions between the 
club and the fans is agreed; even though, not having a paper ticket stamped by the 
Greek police and the tax service to provide to the individuals in exchange for the 
entry fee would automatically mean that there cannot be a transaction and thus the 
individual cannot be allowed in the stadium, this negotiation often results in an 
alternative solution. The auditors, sometimes encouraged by the league’s 
administration itself, allow for ‘fake’ or ‘impromptu’ paper tickets to be exchanged for 
money, permitting fans to enter the stadium unofficially, while officially signing the 
papers that say that since there are no official tickets for the matches, the number of 
entrants is zero. Again, as justified by the auditors in another instance:  
“I wouldn’t do it for others but since my boss (the president of the league) 
knows the X (club’s president), it’s ok. But it’s only for you. Don’t tell anyone about it. 
Oh, make sure the president sends a positive review for my services though, he’s 
friends with the Y (league’s president name)”.  
Interestingly enough, this negotiation did not take place in a secret place 
behind closed doors. Often policemen were present during this negotiation, 
observing without comment.  
Fake tax certificates  
As discussed on the ticket sales tricks section, tickets are issued approximately ten 
days before each match and in order for the club to be eligible to sell them, the 
approval of both the police and the tax authorities is required. This approval process 
from tax authorities is rather lengthy and complex, forcing some clubs to outsource it 
to specialised accountants. The main element of the process, which has caused a 
number of issues in the past, is that for a club to get the approval for the tickets, a 
tax certificate is required, proving that the club’s tax liabilities are settled. This 
certificate is issued monthly upon request, and proves that either all tax liabilities 
have been paid off, or that a settlement has been made on any amount still owed 
(liability or fine) by the club (see Dimitropoulos, 2006). This certificate has to be 
presented by the club’s employees in any dealing with the tax authorities.  
Securing this certificate, however, is not such an easy practice in modern 
Greek football. Unfortunately, football clubs in all divisions are struggling to make 
ends meet, hindering their efforts to adhere to the agreements made with the Tax 
Service. Even when clubs do make profits, they rarely adhere to the tax regulations. 
As sports academics have pointed out, Greek football clubs do not operate with a 
strategic long-term business focus, which would include prioritising taxes 
(Dimitropoulos, 2010). On the contrary a less structured short-term approach is 
adapted, which has impacted on the current poor economic state of the industry.  
Alternative methods are sometimes employed in order to bypass the tax 
certificate. First of all, agreeing on a number of settlements can ‘buy’ the club 
valuable time; notably the period of time between a new debt settlement and its 
lapse due to failure to comply. This short period (one or two months window) can 
prove extremely useful for the club, since it can allow the club to issue tickets for a 
number of matches using the same tax certificate, without paying any additional 
money from the overall debt owed. A second practice is the use of personal 
connections in the local tax service, in order for the tax employees dealing with the 
club to allow for an exception to be made when approving the new tickets, without 
the required valid tax certificate. Since this practice was used rather often by local 
services in dealings with a number of companies, an online country-wide filing 
system was gradually introduced, which, in combination with employees’ relocations 
and tax services restructurings, has created insuperable obstacles that are making 
this method increasingly difficult or even impossible to be followed (see Siomopoulos, 
2013).  
The third practice often encountered in Greek football has attracted 
considerably more attention than the other two, because it has also been used by a 
number of first division clubs that have faced charges and even relegation for their 
actions (Livanios, 2014). When a football club is unable to obtain a tax certificate, 
because money owed to the tax authorities has not been paid, a fake tax certificate 
is created by the club and then presented to the tax service when requested. This 
fake tax certificate resembles the authentic one the club would have acquired 
otherwise, while using a fake protocol number in order to confuse the tax authorities’ 
employees. The fake tax certificate is created by the employees of the club (usually 
the senior financial team) and is given to the employees dealing with tax with a script 
on how he or she should behave when approaching the tax service. This preparation 
includes advice to ‘act natural’, ‘pretend he/she does not know anything about it’ and 
‘call the president/owner should anything go wrong’. Wither a senior male employee 
of the financial or ticketing department of the club, or a novice, young male or female 
employee, from a different department is selected for this purpose. Surprisingly 
enough, this practice has proven extremely successful in Greek football, with clubs 
securing approval for issuing tickets for a number of matches throughout the course 
of the majority of a season, before being found out (see, for example, Livanios, 
2014).  
Finally, one of the most popular techniques applied in Greek football, which is 
usually used when all other practices fail, is the utilisation of personal political 
connections by the owner or the President of the club in order for the tax authorities 
to ‘turn a blind eye’. As has been noted on numerous occasions, Greek politicians, 
and even the Government itself, are willing to help football clubs either directly or 
indirectly way and under any circumstances, especially when denying them could 
result in a severe political cost (see Dimitropoulos, 2010). This lastresort practice is 
rarely spoken of in the clubs and can only take place a small number of times 
throughout each season for each club. But even during those few times, it is very 
likely that this practice can create tension between the tax authorities’ officials and 
the club.  
As a last minute solution, there is often no time for appropriate planning, 
making this practice comprise of just three short phone calls. The first call is made by 
the employee of the club who, while dealing with the tax service was declined the 
request to approve the tickets, either for not having a certificate or for being in a 
possession of a fake one. This call is made directly to the president/owner of the club, 
to who what happened is described briefly. The employee is then instructed by the 
president/owner to wait at the tax service while he tries to ‘fix the problem’. The 
second call is made by the president/owner to a personal connection of his, who is 
often a highly valued and well-known politician. Unfortunately, little information exists 
on these second phone calls, since they usually take place through a private phone, 
using personal connections that are rarely available to the public or even the 
employees of the club. Additionally, little information exists on the politicians involved 
in this kind of phone call, regardless of various accusations that have occasionally 
been made by the Press (see Polyhroniadis, 2011). The third phone call is then 
made by the above-mentioned politician directly to the Director of the local tax 
service from whom the club’s employee tries to get the approval. The phone call is 
made in order for the Director of the service to be convinced to ‘turn a blind eye’ and 
allow for the tickets to be signed and stamped, since the request to do so comes 
from a well-know and highly respected politician. Once again, little information exists 
on the contents of this kind of phone calls, however, it is worth noting that the 
Director might not always comply happily with the politician’s request. A tax service 
Director, shortly after this third phone call, was heard by one of the interviewees 
yelling at the club’s employee:  
“I’m being asked again to be your puppet. That’s enough! I’ll do it, because he 
leaves me with no choice. But tell your President that if he gets the fat one (referring 
to the politician) involved again, I’m going to start making phone calls too. I’ve had 
enough!”  
Whether the tax official would in fact carry out that threat is unknown.  
Players’ salary payments  
The football players are believed to be one of the most valuable assets a club 
possesses. The way in which they are treated, however, is rarely in accordance with 
this belief. Footballers sign lucrative contracts with football clubs in both professional 
divisions of Greek football, however the number of players who actually get paid the 
amount of money agreed with the club in their contract is quite low. Using a number 
of techniques, ranging from friendly requests to violent threats in order to convince 
players to be patient with their delayed salary payments, football clubs have avoided 
paying large sums of money over the past years. It is worth noting that a large 
number of professional players get by with small weekly payments of as low as 50-
100 euro, as a consolation prize for waiting for the delayed salaries. The process by 
which the players are convinced tends to follow an interesting two-fold pattern.  
The owner or president of the club will often wait until the end of the last training 
session of the week to hand out this consolation money, while dealing with a number 
of complaints by the players. His response tends to be similar or identical to the 
following that was witnessed by the researcher: “I am sorry guys, this is all I can do 
for now. Please be patient and I promise I’ll pay you all back next week when this 
new sponsor (naming a random company) signs”. When/if the footballers are not 
happy with his request for patience, his tone changes dramatically: 
“Do you know how lucky you are you’re playing for us? You think you’re that special? 
I have a hundred players younger and more talented waiting for my call, begging for 
a chance to play. Here you get a chance to play, to show your talent. Scouters come 
to all matches; some are even shown on TV. Leave the club and there’s no chance a 
scouter will be picking you”.  
It is also worth noting that by the half of each season, the vast majority of the 
underpaid footballers will make an official request to ‘break’ their contract and leave 
the club. However, leaving a club is not such an easy process. Threats of violence 
will often be made in order to convince the players to stay, with the president of one 
of the clubs the researcher worked for once quoted saying, for example, that “if you 
sign with them, my boys (bodyguards) will break your legs so bad, you won’t be able 
to kick a ball ever again in your life”.  
It is not until a player is able to secure a contract with another club that an 
agreement, that was not honoured by the club in the first place, might be broken. In 
order for the contract to be broken, the footballer will be asked to sign an official 
document claiming that he received all his payments and has no further claims from 
the club, even though he had never (and will never) receive the money which was 
originally agreed on the contract. If the footballer refuses to sign this document, 
additional violent threats or actions might be made, often involving injuring him or 
damaging his property, while postponing the transfer agreement until the transfer 
window is closed or the other clubs withdraw their offer. In other words, the player is 
extorted to write off the money owed by the club in order to continue with his career 
in another club. The club will then claim to the tax authorities that the player has 
been paid, increasing the claimed expenses made during that financial year.  4 
While the above mentioned practice might seem contradictory to the image of 
the superstar rich footballer often portrayed in the media, it is very common in Greek 
                                            
4 Due to the Greek taxation system and the way in which professional football players declare their 
income (often by establishing a company that presents the players’ income as the company’s revenue 
in order to have a smaller taxation rate), it is highly unlikely for the actual amount paid by the club to 
be traced back. Essentially, the expenses claimed by the clubs are not correlated with the income tax 
declaration of the individual player. 
football. In fact, the way in which footballers are treated in modern Greek football is 
so unprofessional that has led to numerous official complaints made to the 
international governing bodies of the sport, that have in turn resulted in the 
International Federation of Professional Footballers (FIFPro) issuing an official 
announcement, consulting footballers to avoid signing contracts with Greek clubs 
(FIFPro, 2013). This may not be an option for most Greek footballers.  
Owing money  
As presented in the previous section, football clubs’ presidents/owners have a 
tendency to not pay money that is owed. This also applies in money owed to other 
employees of the clubs, as well as suppliers of various goods and services. 
Presidents/owners try to make agreements that are not officially recorded, such as 
employing people without an official contract and buying goods and services without 
a receipt, so that a minimum or no account of the money owed by the club is created. 
When the interested parties request the money they are entitled to, the President’s 
responses once again range from friendly requests to violent threats, while asking 
the parties to be patient. Once again, the initial request resembles the polite one 
given to the footballers: “I’m sorry I can’t do anything now. You know how difficult the 
economy is. There is no company that pays in time now. But you know I’ll pay you 
the moment I get the money, you’re at the top of my list”. As time passes and no or 
very little money is paid to the employees or suppliers who repeatedly ask for it, the 
president’s tone changes, becoming increasingly more hostile: “You think I don’t 
know I owe you money? I know! But you are not my first priority. Am I the only one 
who is not paying? No. No company is paying now, look around you. Stop busting 
my balls or you won’t be paid at all”.  
Threatening employees and providers works for the majority of times, 
however, not all the time. Some employees, for example, have insisted on being paid 
the money they were owed and thought that approaching the president the moment 
they knew that he would have cash in his hands might make him change his mind. 
For example, after a football match, when the president is meeting the Head of 
Ticketing who presents him with the earnings of the match. This meeting would 
originally take place in the ticket office of the stadium or the club’s main offices, 
however, when a number of individuals who were owed money found out about it 
and tried to approach him at these venues, another location was selected. In order 
for this location to remain unknown to these individuals, often a cafeteria or a bar, is 
selected by the president and is communicated via text to the Head of Ticketing right 
after the match was over. It is also worth noting that in order for the president to 
avoid being followed, he is often transported to this location hidden at the back of 
someone else’s car. An additional anecdotal detail in this money drop is that in order 
for the full amount of earnings to be delivered without anyone noticing, the cash was 
often hidden in non-suspicious objects, notably the bottom of a plastic coffee holder, 
which was then handed to the President of the club, by the Head of Ticketing.  
Based not only on the above mentioned unsettled accounts, but also on the 
overall profile of the individuals involved in football (further discussed in the following 
section), it is rather common, not only on a match-day, but also on any weekday, for 
the presidents or owners of the clubs to either carry a gun themselves, or be 
accompanied by security personnel who carry guns. These guns are not usually fired 
but are used as an intimidation tactic, especially in tense situations, such as 
negotiating ‘breaking’ a player’s contract, and dealings about money owed to 
employees or third parties. In numerous occasions in which the researcher was 
present, individuals casually placed their gun on top of the meeting table while sitting 
down to start a discussion, without ever referring to it or threatening their 
interlocutors directly.  
Money laundering  
The individuals involved in the administration of Greek football nowadays are often 
very different to the individuals encountered in the administration of most European 
clubs. Even though the Fit and Proper test has been a law in the country since 1999, 
Law 2725 of 1999 (Efimerida Kyverniseos, 1999), it has never been implemented, 
allowing for anyone to be involved in the sport, including a number of dubious 
businessmen who are often accused of various minor or major crimes including 
financial fraud, and even face or have faced imprisonment in the past (see To Vima, 
2011; To Vima, 2014). Surprisingly enough, individuals who have committed fraud in 
other football clubs and have even been banned from all Greek stadia, are often 
‘allowed’ to be involved directly or indirectly with other clubs. Their titles might vary 
from Presidents to CEOs and General Managers, however, as one of them put it 
when asked about his job, they see themselves as the ‘highest power’ of the club 
(‘geniko koumando’ in Greek). 
 Those individuals have often used football clubs as a money laundering 
mechanism, which facilitates them in declaring a substantial amount of income every 
year, an amount that does not attract the authorities’ attention, while justifying an 
extravagant lifestyle and covering other possible illegal activities (Kathimerini, 2013). 
A number of these individuals have been actively involved in other activities, such as 
illegal betting, gun, drugs and oil illegal markets. However, since justifying their 
income from these activities would be extremely difficult, providing a legitimate 
account for this money through a football club appears to be an easier solution. 
Interestingly enough, some of these individuals appear to be avoiding legal 
implications for their actions, despite the media attention they might occasionally 
attract. Providing more specific information on these cases would require for 
individual Presidents/owners to be profiled, which exceeds the aim of this paper and 
will, therefore, not be attempted.  
In practical terms, however, as with any successful business, it would be 
rather costly to run a football club that appears to be earning money. Thus, a 
different method is being followed. ‘Fake’ sponsorship agreements appear 
unexpectedly a few weeks before the end of each financial year (Eleftherotypia, 
2010). These agreements, often with companies owned by family members or 
friends of the owners of the clubs, are rather lucrative for the clubs, allowing them to 
present a very high income at the end of the season. Unfortunately, however, most 
of these agreements are cancelled or, accounting-wise are being noted as money 
that will not be collected5 (Zafeiropoulos, 2012) and are often written off after a few 
years. This cancellation or accounting trick takes place after the financial year is over 
and does not affect the earning claims the owner made for that particular year. It is 
only after an extensive auditor’s check that this trick can be traced, and since 
auditors’ checks do not usually take place in Greek football, this method has been 
applied numerous times without any repercussions to the clubs’ owners. The 
practicality of the whole process is that the owners get a legitimate cover for their 
income, while realistically not proving how and if the income was made.  
Match-fixing profits  
Match-fixing in Greek football has attracted significant media attention over the past 
few decades (Eleftherotypia, 2013a), with two major scandals involving numerous 
professional football clubs revealed, resulting in legal prosecutions and even the 
imprisonment of club Presidents and owners. The most recent scandal, as our 
analysis of the EYP (2011) data suggests, involved numerous actors of Greek 
football, including Club Presidents/owners, football players, referees, bookmakers, 
illegal agents (intermediates betting on behalf of other actors), enforcers (personal 
protection and intimidation intermediaries hired by the Presidents/owners), football 
managers and player agents. These actors were part of numerous, flexible networks 
of varying size, which allowed for match-fixing to be ‘organised’. These webs were 
formed on the basis of both long-term and short-term relationships, which were 
incentivised by either the promise of reward or threat:  
“If you do this for me, I’ll take good care of you. I’ll tell you which match to bet on and 
you’re going to earn good money. I’ll even fix you up with my guy who can do the 
betting for you”.  
“If you don’t do it, I’ll make sure the only match you ref for is the local school’s 
match”.  
Bearing in mind both the number of individuals involved in the scandal and their 
direct involvement with the Greek football industry, as well as the fact that financial 
profit was both the incentive and the result of match-fixing, the financial implications 
of match-fixing are rather significant. Notably, the unreported large amounts of 
money earned by illegal betting, that are impossible to be accounted for and, 
therefore, are not taxed. There is, of course, an irony here – these funds are not 
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unlikely to be collected. 
‘clean’ but provided nobody matches their cash expenditures with their declared 
income, it is not risky not to launder the funds.  
Another issue that we came across from the examination of the National 
Intelligence Agency’s wiretapped conversations is that not all individuals involved 
with Greek football would fit the same profile of the powerful and dangerous 
‘gangster-like’ criminal. In fact, one could say that they tend to fall under two very 
distinctive categories; the ‘powerful’ and the ‘pushover’. The former category 
includes the individuals who are often described as the ones ‘pulling the strings’, the 
ones with the ability and power to influence the current and possibly the future state 
of the sport, with direct influence not only on one club but a number of them, through 
their influence on the latter ‘pushover’ category. This latter category is mainly 
populated by Presidents/owners, who might also appear to be dangerous: their 
power, however, is limited to the microcosm of the club (the people employed by or 
connected to the club). Their overall actions are often the result of the influence or 
directions they receive from the ‘powerful’ category. That being said, 
Presidents/owners in both categories tend to result in the same practices as far as 
financial criminal activities are concerned.  
Discussion  
A number of observations can be made from our findings. Overall, the account that 
emerges from our examination does not vindicate the heavy emphasis that orthodox 
accounts of ‘organised crime’ place on characteristics such as rigid organisation, 
coordination, hierarchy and so on in the commission of criminal activities (financial 
and other) within football. Rather, our findings are consistent with financial crimes 
committed within football as criminal activities being less robust from an 
organisational viewpoint, carried out by individuals or clusters of individuals that 
assemble on the basis of opportunity rather than authority.  
Issues around financial crimes within football clubs must be located within the 
overall football-related context in the country, which is, of course, an extension of the 
general financial, entrepreneurial and political landscape in the country. Firstly, 
Greek football clubs are structured differently in comparison to most European ones 
regarding their ownership and administration. All clubs participating in the top two 
national divisions, Super League and Football League, are privately owned, with 
their main shareholder keeping an active role in the everyday running of the club. 
The shareholder is often voted by the Board of Administration in the role of the 
‘President of the club’ who, in most cases, acts as the equivalent of the CEO or the 
Chairman. In some occasions, the elected President is not the shareholder, but a 
person acting on behalf of the main shareholder, representing their interests while 
managing both playing and non-playing aspects of the football club. Although a Fit 
and Proper test has been passed as a law of the Greek Government in 1999, as 
mentioned earlier, it is currently not actively applied, allowing for anyone to be 
involved in the administration of the sport.  
Secondly, the general enormous financial pressures that most Greek football 
clubs (even the traditionally powerful ones) face in the current entrepreneurial and 
financial landscape of the country. One of the reasons for the financial hardship of 
football clubs, among other, is the reduced attendance in the Greek stadia with an 
average of 4,328 spectators per Super League football match according to Super 
League data (Koumbis, 2013), which data are those taken account of when 
appealing for sympathetic treatment. Though these data might not be accurate, for 
reasons given in this paper, the order of magnitude is likely to be about right and 
gives an idea of the scale of the ‘real’ problem.  
Related to the above is that the ‘outcome uncertainty’ within the Greek football 
league has reached extreme low levels, causing significant competitive imbalance 
among the clubs. This imbalance did not only lead to the creation of ‘big’ and ‘small’ 
teams, as Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) suggest, but also to the formation of ‘rich’ 
and ‘poor’ clubs. As Schmidt and Berri (2001) note, since the performance on the 
field in professional competitive sports has a direct impact on their financial income, 
the gap between these two groups is affected by the competitive balance or 
imbalance of the league or competition. The minimised outcome uncertainty in Greek 
football led to high levels of competitive imbalance within the professional leagues of 
the sport, leading to the creation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs, with the gap between 
these two categories being widened year after year. Another way to underline this 
competitive imbalance within the league would be to examine the level of probability 
of determining the winner of the league (see Buzzacchi et al., 2004). Taking into 
consideration that the Greek Championship has been won by the same club 16 
times within the last 18 years, outcome uncertainty has reached an extreme low level 
in Greek football, with the Super League often being characterised as a ‘monopoly’ 
(Eleftherotypia, 2013b).  
Within this context, and although we do not claim that we are in the position to 
offer an exhaustive range of motivations for financial crime within football clubs, we 
can identify two different types of actors: The ones that commit financial crimes 
simply because of personal greed in the presence of opportunity and in the absence 
of substantial regulation in the (Greek) football industry. “Opportunity to commit a 
crime in a business or company environment”, Padgett (2015: 201) argues, “is a 
situation where an offender circumvents internal financial controls or takes 
advantage of a weakness in those controls”.  
The second type is the people who commit these types of financial crimes as 
a response to the ferocious dynamics in the football industry. Within the formation of 
this financial imbalance among clubs that we mentioned above, the second type of 
financial criminal resembles to what Antonopoulos and Hall (2014: 331) have called 
the “‘reluctant criminal undertaker’: the pragmatist who simply seeks to ‘get things 
done’ on behalf of the interests of the self, and according to the logic of the market’s 
‘dark heart’, in the midst of ‘inherited’ or artificially created circumstances, no matter 
how brutally competitive and unforgiving they might be”. Whereas Antonopoulos and 
Hall’s (2014) ‘reluctant criminal undertaker’ is the product of pre-emptive fear of 
losing one’s finger-hold on the economy, the people committing financial crime within 
football clubs are the product of the pre-emptive fear of the club ‘not making it’ and 
losing their finger-hold in the football industry. In this sense, football-related financial 
crime in Greece appears to be an integral part of a symbiosis between personal 
greed, aspirations and needs, as well as ferocious market dynamics in the world of 
football that disadvantage most of the football clubs, their players and their officials 
who now operate as small and medium entrepreneurs cutting corners in the absence 
of substantial regulation.  
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